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Land Resettlement and Development Strategy 
In Kenya 
John y. Harbeson 
The-transfer of land in the former ,n.?hita Highlands1' from European i 
to African occupation has been fundamental to the transfer of political 
power in Kenya. The political importance of this resettlement did not derive 
solely from the desire of African nationalist leaders to remove European 
1 
Settlers from land allegedly stolen by them or from the need to mitigate the 
threat to political stability posed by growing numbers of landless; unemployed 
Africans . Of equal or greater political importance has been the opportunity 
the resettlement program afforded European settlers to escape the feared 
consequences of African rule. 
The political and social significance of land resettlement does not 
end with the transfer of political power but extends to the post independence 
drive for development. Since independence the emphasis on settlement schemes 
has been on equalling or surpassing the production and employment levels set 
by the previous European farmers,, thus- to confound widespread pessimism about 
the economic prospects of the schemes. In this paper I shall argue that 
political and social considerations are as important to the post independence 
economic success of settlement schemes as they wore in the initiation of this 
land transfer before independence. In the first section I shall try to show 
the role of land resettlement in the de-emphasis of these social and political 
considerations- in the second, to show the consequences for settlement of 
this da-eraphasis. 
Resettlement and the Transfer of Power 
The three phases in the evolution of the settlement program have 
been directly related to the important changes of political mood that have 
marked Kenya's transition to independence. The fira.t.._phase_vias the "low 
density" program agreed upon in principle at the 13G0 Lancaster House 
Conference and implemented in 1961. These schemes ware scattered throughout 
the highlands on high potential, underdeveloped land. Settlers were required 
to possess farming experience and some working capital to qualify for plots 
from which, they could expect to derive £100 of income after subsistence and 
loan repayments. These schemes reflected both the policies and the problems 
of European inspired multi-racialism in Kenya. By scattering schemes through-
out the highlands and making use of high potential-underdeveloped land, "low 
density" settlement contributed simultaneously to racial.integration in 
agricultural areas and agricultural development. But the program accomodated 
only a limited number of comparatively prosperous African farmers, very little 
relief of rural unemployment was undertaken, and it strongly reflected the 
European objectives of diminishing the force of African nationalists, and making 
possible substantial continued European farming in the Highlands. 
The "low density" program became inadequate almost as soon as it was 
initiated because the dimensions of African landlessness and unemployment 
increasedj exacerbated by increasing European uncertainty leading to near 
cessation of development and decreased employment on European farms. 
Independence was to come sooner than expected.,, and the long range objectives 
of multi-racialism wore displaced by increasing European right wing demands 
for U.K. funds to assist both European farmers wishing to sell and emigrate 
and those seeking insurance against post independence expropriation. Great 
Britain responded in July 1352 with the i!miliion acre" program of "high density" 
settlement for an additional 30>GQQ Africans, required to be landless and 
unemployed, on plots capable of producting £25 to £70 net income. The third 
phase, begun concurrently was initially undertaken for humanitarian and security 
reasons to enable elderly, incapacitated, and isolated farmers to sell their 
farms. Many have been sold to individual farmers rather than subdivided for 
settlement schemes in order to maintain economies of scale. Since independence 
such transfers have continued either to individual farmers or to groups 
settlers farming as cooperative societies. 
Together', the three phases have accomodated 35,000 African farmers 
and about one-third of the European settlers. ' The schemes have extended the 
"spheres of influence" of all major tribal groups., although the Kikuyu have 
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benefitted most. 4-0% of tha^tfltaLLgsgt of £22,000,000 has bean met by 
British government grants- the remainder-by loans from the 5lorid Bank, the 
Commonwealth Development-Corporation, the Nest German Government and the 
British Government. 
- Land resettlement contributed to important strategy changes by 
African leaders during the transfer of power partly because of the awkward 
t 
position in which the settlement program placed them. Initiallys the African 
leaders said that resettlement was acceptable but not as a final realization 
of nationalist goals regarding land, that settlement could not preclude 
"further changes" after Uhuru. Thus they tried to steer between accepting a 
program inspired by officials and European leaders whose motives they distrusted 
and maintaining the support of lower echelon politicians whose free land 
demands jnost of them knew were excessive. They did not discourage settling schemes 
Africans in the Highlands but observed the "low densityRaided landed> not 
landless. Africans. African leaders approved the removal of established racial 
land barriers but wore wary of attempts to demobilize African nationalism 
before its principle objective3 political independence, had been achieved. Most 
leaders saw. tae inadvisability of expropriating European farms but many found 
it politically difficult initially to present this view to their followers. 
This ambiguity in the African position heightened the fears of right-wing 
Europeans., and strengthened their hand in London and within the European 
community at the expense of the multi-racialism advocates. This influence led 
to the second phase or "high density" settlement. 
This new and much larger phase of resettlement helped draw African 
leaders away from maintenance of nationalist policies and toward reconciliation 
with European adversaries of African nationalisms toward a new spirit of non-
racialism. As independence approached,, African leaders increasingly realized 
their own interests lay in de-emphasizing further resettlement. Nationalist 
pressures had enabled right-wing Europeans to secure a program substantially 
increasing the financial burden on the future African government and diverting 
development funds away from African areas to the European Highlands. If the 
political necessity of a second million acre scheme were proved to the U.K. 
Government by Europeans, the resulting financial obligations to the U.K. 
Government and the priority which European interests would gain over those of 
farmers in the African areas could only weaken the independent African govern-
ment and the prospects of post independence political stability. 
Gradually3 therefore, African leaders decided that political stability 
would result from territorial stability rather than territorial expansion of 
African areas, from economic development of existing rather than new African 
areas. Territorial expansion had both political and economic costs. Politic-
ally, the departure of European farmers removed the buffer between the large 
and small tribes, expanded principally the land of larger, densely populated 
and therefore land hungry tribes, and recognised nationalist land claims — 
but at the cost of heightening fears of smaller tribes whose lands had been 
protected by the European buffer. Economically, redevelopment of European 
areas by Africans was thought to be less promising than further development 
of existing African areas because most of the best land was in the latter 
and because the prospects of settlement schemes were viewed with pessimism. 
Conversely, territorial stability had both political and economic benefits. 
Uith delay of independence no longer feared s settlement no longer threatened 
African nationalism but rather-post independence political stability. Emphasis 
on territorial stability rather than territorial expansion implied the security 
of existing tribal lands and the assuaging of fear based on tribal expansion. 
Larger tribes would accept territorial stability because they had gained 
through resettlement and all tribes gained the promise of assistance to their 
economic development. Economically, tereitorial stability and development 
of existing areas implied that competent remaining European farmers could 
continue their contribution to the country's development ,> a contribution 
particularly valuable in offsetting the initial economic problems of settle-
• 
ment schemes. Furthermore, development of existing African areas meant that 
funds could be channelled to the Africans where the economic potential was 
greater. 
Thus., even before independence African leaders de-emphasised 
settlement as_partof an evolving policy designed to achieve post-independence 
political stability through economic development of existing African areas 
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and territorial stability rather than further- expansion. Implicit in this 
policy were a naw' spirit of non-racialism under which contributions to economic 
development by all races have been welcomed and a policy of reconciling 
political differences in the nationalist movement to facilitate contributions 
by all "ethnic groups to development. 
POST INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Post independence policy continues the emphasis on economic develop-
ment of former African areas in preference to the resettled areas and expand-
--••-
ing African areas by further resettlement. Economic development is also 
emphasized by comparison to social change and political development. In the 
Development Plan 1066-70, the emphasis on former rather than new African areas 
is justified by the greater agricultural potential of the former African areas. 
Economic development is given greater emphasis than social change because the 
creation of greater economic opportunities is thought to be the sine qua non 
for social change. "If projects do not offer benefits in excess of their 
costsj they cannot contribute to economic development and it is unlikely that 1 they would make a substantial contribution to social change and improvement." 
Four implications follow from this strategy. First, social change 
is defined in economic terms. The "social approach" to economic development 
in the plan means "to involve the people of Kenya at every step and to an 
A 
increasing extent in the economic development of the nation."""Second, social 
change is assumed to follow naturally from opportunities for economic develop-
ment. The plan does recognize the importance of changing traditional 
behavior patterns. But it argues that economic opportunities are sufficient 
in themselves to brine about these changes: "Development of the monetary 
economy will in itself generate opportunities that were not available in the 
traditional subsistence economy. These opportunities will in turn induce 
changes in behaviour patterns and incentives by making available to people 
a range of consumer goods that were not available to them before and by 
Kenya Development Plan 1366-70, p. 57. 
* Ibidj p. 
- 6 -
2 
opening marketc in which they can sell their increased production." Third, 
social change is to take place primarily thorugh institutions designed for 
economic purposes. These institutions include schools., credit organizations, 
self-help schemes and cooperatives, and are justified in each case only by 
their place in the economic structure of the country. Fourth.since there is 
no discussion of political organisations., it is inferred that political 
organisations and processes have no role in the development process. 
The success of this development strategy depends on its ability to 
elicit the popular participation necessary to achieve the desired levels of 
economic development. If participation is to be achieved, the institutions 
through which economic development is to be achieved must satisfy two basic 
requirements. They must translate., economic opportunities into reality for 
the individual participants, and they must be channels suitably designed.to 
permit and eccourage participation by individuals in the development process. 
Participation., however, can be achieved in at least two ways: (1) 
development of existing economic assets by the present owners, or (2) transfer 
of assets to new owners. The former approach implies assisting greater 
economic participation by those persons already in possession of economic 
assets who may not be fully involved in the modern economic sector; the 
latter, assisting persons without significant economic assets to acquire them 
as a prerequisite for participation in the modern economy. The present 
emphasis of rural economic development on former African areas means employing 
largely the former approach. 'The settlement schemes are the principal example 
of the latter1 approach. 
The settlement schemes test the relevance of the development strategy 
to the task of achieving participation in the modern economy by transferring 
economic assets to new participants. The conversion of the highlands from 
European mixed farms to African small holdings raises a question as to whether 
the economic institutions employed by relatively large scale farmers have 
been converted to the peculiar requirements of the new small farmers. 
2 Ibid. p. 50. 
- 7 
Furthermore 3 most settlers aire either newcomers to the modern Economy or 
have experienced it only indirectly as employees of former European farmers. 
This prompts a question whether or not the institutions, particularly cooper-
ative societies, designed to channel rural participation in the modern economy 
are effective with new participants. 
•* 
Settlement Schemes^ . The Incomplete Tran3formation 
A preliminary appraisal of economic development on the settlement schemes 
suggests that economic institutions have not_.fully succeeded in translating 
economic opportunities into reality for the settlers nor have they induced 
full participation by them. This has happened partly because opportunities for 
economic development have in practicc been limited and partly because the 
assumptions of the development strategy regarding social change appear somewhat 
unrealistic. 
A« Problems in the Economic Structure 
When the high density schemes were established, it was widely held 
that they would not be economically viable. Especially within the last years 
however, some high density schemes, particularly on the Kinangop, have produced 
crops in excess even of their quotas. Pyrethrum quotas, unfilled a year ago, 
have in some cases been doubled and trebled. Milk production substantially 
exceeds contract requirements on most Kinangop schemes. 
Where such economic performance occurs-, attention is called to the 
schemes® limited opportunites for further economic development. Overproduction 
in relation to quotas and contracts prevents the settlers from participating 
fully in the cash economy and is a depressant to development. Output also 
exceeds drying facilities for pyrethrum and canning facilities for milk with 
a similar effect. The deficiencies may well be remedied in time and merely 
reflect underestimation of production prospects. For pyrethrums however, the 
value to the settlers of their increasing responsibility for production of 
this crop is qualified by the prospect of a diminished market resulting from 
the imminent competition of a Japanese synthetic. Forward planning may be 
necessary to adjust these scheme budgets for possible diminution of the market 
for their principle crop. Milk production is adversely affected by the 
complexity of the marketing system. Prices have varied considerably depend-
ing on whether output was intended for sale as fresh milk; as manufactured 
milks or for conversion to butter. They have also varied depending upon 
whether the farmer possessed a quota or a contract. Quota prices have been 
higher because the farmer undertook to contribute to the supply of fresh milk 
far sale throughout the year and to pay a penalty for non-delivery. Quotas 
are still used* but the Kenya Dairy Board now sells only contracts carrying no 
penalty for non-delivery and therefore a lower price. High Density settlement 
schemes operate therefore on contract, but settlers know about these price 
differencials without understanding the reasons for them. Politicians are. 
therefore able to depress the incentive of producers by spreading rumours of 
price differencials. Marketing of general produce through central organizations 
is beset by communications problems. Settlers distrust the system whereby 
producc is evaluated and accepted or rejected at the central depot rather than 
on the schemes and also the delays in payment. Private traders raject crops 
or accept and pay for them on the spot. Settlers prefer the latter even 
though the size of the market or the price m3y be lower. 
The problems of settler participation in the cash economy occur not 
only in marketing by also in production. One hindrance is the shortage of 
tractor equipment which is insufficient to plough more than half the arable 
land or; most schemes. On some schemes,, settlement cooperative engage out-
side 'contractors for ploughing and harvesting,, but their ability to do so is 
hampered by their weak bargaining position. Where a crop like wheat is 
involved, rigid timetables for ploughing, planting and harvesting prevent the 
cooperatives from dickering with contractors over terms of service. The 
inexperience of settlers with such contracts, however, increases the chances 
of misunderstandings and therefore unacceptable delays. Delays are caused, 
in any event, by the frequent impassibility of scheme roads. Such difficulties 
frequently diminish or eliminate the settlers' profit with predictable effect 
upon incentive. 
These economic difficulties prevent the full participation of settlers 
in the cash economy. The main problem is therefore not to encourage cash crop 
production but to ensure that such difficulties do not destroy the incentive 
he has acquired. Perhaps agricultural planning presently underestimates the 
incentive of the farmer to produce cash crops and overestimates the suitability 
of existing economic arrangements for encouraging that incentive. The problem 
might perhaps be tackled in two ways. First, more agricultural education 
resources might be devoted to educating the farmer to the nature and problems 
of the economic process in which he is to participate. Particularly where 
farmers have shown willingness and ability to produce cash crops3 this 
course might have bcneficial effects on his ability of deal with the problems of 
such participation and therefore on his incentive. Second, removal of dis-
incentives to production could be a principal objective in the allocation of 
remaining loan funds for settlement. For example; in the Xinanrop drying 
facilities for pvrethrum and tractor equipment should receive first consideration. 
Objects of settler suspicion such as milk price differentials should either 
explained 
be adequatel^/sc as to eliminate distrust or corrected by allocating additional 
contracts or by directing settlers* efforts to the production of other crops. 
P. 'Problems of jSocial Change 
The theory that economic opportunities with induced social change 
leading to economic development assumes that development institutions translate 
these opportunities into reality for the participants. But development at the 
grass roots level on the settlement schemes is diminished not only by economic 
difficulties but also by an hiatus between administrative priorities and 
social requirements of the settlers. The administrative officers emphasize 
(1) production, (2) loan repayments,, and (3) curbing the activities of 
dissident politicians. But the settlers' requisites for participation are 
very different* First;, they require sufficient knowledge of the development 
process in which they take part and its difficulties if they are to combat 
ill-informed rumours spread by self-interested politicians. Second, instruction 
is needed not cnlv in the importance and purpose of cooperative societies but 
also in ways and means by which they can take part in the society's activities. 
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Settlers might not resist • election to leadership positions if instruction were 
riven5 for instance, on how settlers can deploy manpower on their shanbas so 
as to coraroens'atc for their absence- Third, encouragement is needed for communitv 
development proiects designed to overcome lack of trust amenf settlers which 
weakens the cooperative societies. 
Those unfulfilled social requisites leave settlers largely unprepared 
to participate effectively in the development process. Lack of preparation 
seems to stand behind the .better known difficulties of the schemes • diversion 
of loan repayments to inappropriate uses. use of society's equipment for 
private rather than public purposes, frequent changes in society leadership 
and its weakness and embezzlement of funds. ?.eing arrson^  strangers in the 
society. unfamiliar with the process in which he takes ~art and unprepared 
to participate in the operation of the cooperative societies, the settler's 
behavior tends to be cuided by unnualified self interest. The lack of 
qualification seems lar^elv responsible for many of the difficulties. 
Although substantial economic incentives through development loans3 
advisory service, and strricultural education have been offered, settlers 
have not apparently undergone the socir-1 change necessary to effective 
participation in development. Economic incentives by themselves are sufficient 
to induce production increases. Full participation, however, seems to include 
more than mere production and to be beyond the reach of purely economic 
incentives. The assumption that economic opportunities induce social change 
therefor.; seems to be oversimplified. 
C. Problems of Administration 
Since the settlers are not prepared to participate effectively in 
the cooperative societies leadership remains in the hands of the scheme 
administrators. Since administrators are dependent upon Government for their 
position., they naturally tend to observe requirements and restraints set up 
by their employers rather than represent perceived requiremetts of settlers to 
the administration. From the settlers* point of view; therefore,, a leadership 
gap exists proof of which lies in the hiatus between settler and administr-
ative priorities. 
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This conflict of priorities reflects, a fundamental disparity between 
centrally defined ~oals and some local prerequisites for economic development. 
Progress on loan repayment., for example, relates to a fundamental political 
objective of post independence development" eliminating and preventing 
"colonial'' relationships with more developed countries. It is not the loan 
but the circumstances in which it was contracted that the Kenya government 
views with concern. "The settlement process was inherited from the British and 
was designed more to aid those Europeans who '-ranted to leave than the African.? 
who received the land. Our land problems should not be settled on terms 
decided in the United Kingdom. Instead our policies and plans in agriculture 
should be determined by our need to develop and financial support sought for 
these plans from several sources. ! The settlement loan is viewed as a 
vestige of colonial authority, contracted in the interests of non-Kenya 
citizens; and contrary to Kenya's principal objective of development. Removal 
of the loan obligation removes the vestiee of colonialism and furthers the 
policy of ncn-alignment. 
The difficulty arises because emphasis on loan repayment helps to 
substantiate the view that settlement because it does not make an efficient 
contribution to development,, is-not in the country's best interests. Althourh 
some schemes hive demonstrated ability to produce bumper cash crops, emphasis 
on loar.^rnpaynent puts .at leaat_,a_temporary ceiling on further economic 
assistance for scheme economies. Water reticulation,, pyrethrum dryers., and 
tractors are all investments of direct value in realizing maximum production j . 
on schemes. Although some progress has been made in equipping schemes with 
such production aids, the process is slowed down because crop proceeds which 
might be directed to these ends are absorbed by repayments. From the 
administration point of view, therefore, production excess of budgets and of 
processing and marketinf? facilities is an -rhnrrascm jnt because it stimulates 
the demand for additional development with which loan repayment obligations 
compete. 
3 
Kenya > Sessional Paper No. 10 1963-5, African Socialism and its Application 
to Planning in Kenya, P. 37. 
Loan repayment drives a wedge between central goals and local pre-
requisites for development only if development is conceived in purely economic 
terms and if existing loan obligations are considered a bar to further invest-
ment in economic development. If these conditions apply: the Plan's con-
centration on economic development is unwise, in the case of settlement, since 
increased production cannot be accomodated. Since social change does not in 
any event ar>near to follow economic development on the schemes . administrative 
priorities might advisably be altered to concentrate more directly on problems 
of social change. Limitations imposed on the pace of economic development 
night profitably be turned to advantage by inducing requisite social change 
preparatory to the next stare of economic development. 
Problems of Cooperative Societies 
The problems of coordinating social and political change with c-cnnom 
development come to institutional focus in the settlement scheme cooperative 
societies. The societies are set up to perform such functions as marketing 
produce- supervising whatever processing of ,produce takes place on the scheme, 
operating scheme stores, supervising artificial insemination and dipping of 
cattle, and coordinating loan repayments. A cooperative society is headed 
by an elected committee ccm^ricinr a chairmanf a secretary and as many as 10 
other members. The committee supervises a number of paid employees of whom 
the bookkeeper is nerhans the most important. The societies are supervised 
on behalf of the Department of Cooperative Development by cooperative officers 
and their assistants. 
The common judgement on cooperative societies is that they suffer 
from inadequate management, and the members and elected officers from 
inadequate training. Such judgement is based on weakness and instability 
of cooperatives5 elected leadership- widespread financial abuses often 
perpetrated by the leadership, and incapacity to manapc the- technical side. 
Steps have been taken by the Department cf Cooperative Development to tighten 
financial control cf societies by the Department and„ to a lesser extant, to 
train elected cooperative officers for more effective general management. 
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The problems are more complicated than lack of training and 
administrative control. On the one hand the elected officers, relative to 
other settlers., do not lack educational attainments. While most settlers have 
been educated no higher than standard four, elected officials and book-
keepers generally have at least standard sis and often some secondary education. 
Education of such persons for society leadership should not therefore bo an 
impossible task. Similarly management can easily be justified in the short 
run butj given the stated objective of'the government to increase the 
responsibility of the societies for their own affairs, policy must eventually 
turn to improving rather than replacing leadership of the societies. 
Despite the apparent leadership potential- settlement cooperatives 
have remained weak and the leadership has not been forthcoming, fundamentally 
because of the hiatus between administrative priorities and social requisites. 
The unfulfilled social requisites weaken settlers1 support for the societies, 
especially when they are pushed by administrators into unpopular courses of 
action such as deducting substantial percentages of settlers' profits to meet 
loan obligations. The same deficiency increases the blame settlers place on 
the societies for problems of marketing and processing. Settlers therefore do 
not see societies as any improvement over middlemen, and in fact, many prefer 
to sail to middlemen thereby further weakening the societies. These sources 
of weakness feed sometimes potent opposition to the cooperative society centering 
around local 'politicians'. Opposition to societies is strengthened by 
evidence of corruption among elected officials creating leadership instability. 
Such corruption is increased because, of reluctance of settlers on economic 
grounds to leave their shambas for society duty. Elected leaders often respond 
either by resigning prematurely or by taking compensation for themselves 
through embezzelement. These weaknesses make the societies dependent upon the 
administration for sufficient authority to carry out their enterprises, there-
- » 
by weakening the only channel through which settlers5 problems can be re-
presented effectively to the administration, marketing organizations, or 
local government. 
Since necessary social chantrc does not appear to follow economic 
inputs, the absence of such change and the presence of economic problems 
strengthens tacit and active political opposition to the institutions of 
economic development. The apparent assumption of development strate.tr/ that 
political organizations have no place in the development process exposes the 
development process to dysfunctional political activity JLn.-th---w fact of 
development problems. Attention to social requisites perhaps by more effective 
use of political lenders might help to create the decree of social change 
required for the next stage of economic development and shield the process of 
economic development from political activities which are dysfunctional to 
development. 
CONCLUSION 
Return of the :!!-?hite Highland-. ! to the African people was a central 
objective of African nationalism in Kenya. Land Resettlement which in fact 
fhelped realize that objective was nevertheless initiated primarily to serve 
the interests of European farmers who wished to leave -Kenya because they 
\feared the consequences of independence. As independence approached African 
leaders began to de-emphasize expanding African areas by resettlement because 
of the interests it appeared to serve, the financial burden on the independent 
government, and the greater economic potential of existing areas. Emphasis 
on development of existing rathe-*- than new areas diminished the land based 
fears of tribes supporting KADU and of remaining European farmers and paved the 
way for the reconciliation of both with KA-U. 
The emphasis on economic development of former African areas has 
continued into independence and this has in turn meant emphasis on increasing 
participation cf the modern economy by developing existing assets rather than 
transferring assets to new participants. Settlement development, however, is 
a major test of the latter approach. The development strategy emphasizes a 
"social approach' to economic development which means that social change 
admittedly necessary to economic development is assumed to be induced naturally 
by creation of economic incentives. On settlement schemes, however, social 
change seens net to follow economic inducements in this way ., but merely to 
^stimulate production. Absence of social change permits negative political 
opposition to interfere with the loan repayments that must be met before 
further investment in economic development can be contemplated. 
jt 
An alternative and perhaps more appropriate strategy would use 
the temporary ceiling on further economic development as on opportunity to work 
directly on social requisites for economic development in order to remove the 
bases fcr- political activity presently dysfunctional to development and to 
provide a basis for futur*? economic development. 
